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Abstract
Terrorist activity has increased and evolved in Western societies in the twenty-first
century as terrorist organizations have sought new methods to further their ideologies and
goals. Counterterrorism thus requires a similar evolution that undoubtedly reverses the
historic trend wherein counterterrorism has been merely reactive. Through interviews
with experts, qualitative analysis of governmental publications and documents, and
review of existing literature, this project explores the institutions of intelligence,
education, and the media and their work within the larger counterterrorism and antiradicalization framework of Western states. The project focuses specifically on domestic
intelligence operations, intelligence sharing agreements, the United Kingdom’s Prevent
strategy, and media framing of terrorism and counterterrorism. The future interplay of
these three institutions requires proactive action and outlook that attempts to mitigate the
reach of terrorist organizations, particularly in protecting the public from radicalization.
It will also entail other institutions like religion and non-governmental organizations to
address the far-reaching societal implications of terrorism.
Keywords: Terrorism, counterterrorism, radicalization, intelligence, education, media
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In the late twentieth century, modern terrorism transitioned into its fourth wave,
characterized by transnational terrorist organizations and referred to as the ‘Religious
Wave.’1 While organizations of the ‘New Left’ third wave were primarily nationalist
entities who used theatrical approaches, organizations of the fourth wave sought to
further political ideologies that were often linked to religious and ethnic identities.
Instead of terrorism being a strategy and a means to an end, it has become more of a
movement centered around these organizations and their ideology. Islam is at the heart
of this wave as groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) have been the
principle terrorist organizations that the West is combatting and have historically been the
most durable during this wave. Many Western societies thus adapted counterterrorism
measures and policies that focused on neutralizing chemical, biological, and cyberattacks.2 Ultimately, analysts and experts considered suicide airplane hijacking to be
antiquated as this was seen as a tactic used often by the terrorists of the third wave (i.e., a
theatrical approach). They also believed mass, simultaneous attacks in general to be
beyond the capacity and capability of terrorist organizations. According to Brian Jenkins,
the goal of terrorism in 1975 was to have “a lot of people watching and a lot of people
listening and not a lot of people dead.”3 Jenkins highlights the idea that before 9/11
many experts believed the mechanisms of terrorism to be unitary: publicity was the key.
However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 demolished that viewpoint
and demonstrated how misplaced these assumptions were. 9/11 was a pivotal point in the

1
David C. Rapoport, "The four waves of modern terror: International dimensions and
consequences," An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences (2013), 295.
2
Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 25, no. 5 (2002), 306.
3
Hoffman, “Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism,” 306.
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fourth wave of terrorism that rejuvenated a failing cause. 4 It clearly defined this new
wave of terrorism as the most destructive and indiscriminate wave to date. Terrorism
transitioned to a ternary mechanism at this junction, focusing not only on publicity but
also on the loss of human life and psychological repercussions. From a publicity
standpoint, terrorism evolved into a Hollywood-esque phenomenon with terrorist groups
creating productions and propaganda aimed at recruitment and international messaging.
In terms of the loss of life, modern terrorism focused on the annihilation of contrary
ideologies and henceforth used murder as the primary tactic. Yet, psychologically, this
new form of terrorism highlighted the elicitation of irrational and emotional responses,
fear, and intimidation which made it arguably the most important goal of post-9/11
terrorism.5 It is from this devastating event that we see the emergence of contemporary
and modern counterterrorism policy and measures. Analysts and policy-makers had to
rework and redefine their understanding of and conventional wisdom on terrorism. Yet,
this has been the general trend when examining the evolution of terrorism and
counterterrorism. Terrorism changes its strategies; counterterrorism has to reevaluate and
congruously change its strategies. Counterterrorism must mirror the characteristics of
terrorism by being tireless, innovative, and dynamic. It is necessary to create
counterterrorism policies that no longer allow terrorist organizations and networks to be
one step ahead, and unfortunately, that has not been achieved yet.
Traditional counterterrorism focuses on five components to defeat terrorism:
diplomacy, economic sanctions, military options, covert intelligence operations, and law

4
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Rapoport, “Four waves of modern terror,” 297.
Hoffman, “Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism,” 313.
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enforcement actions.6 It involves police work, intelligence, special operations, and
security measures that were successful in combatting the previous waves of modern
terrorism. While these strategies are still viable and important components in today’s
broader counterterrorism strategy, they are not sufficient in fighting today’s terrorist
organizations that have global roots and connections. Most of the terrorist organizations
today are complex entities defined by statelessness, transnationalization, deterritorialization, and nontraceability. 7 Their form of terrorism is planned, purposeful,
and premeditated. Diplomacy and economic sanction is nearly impossible due to their
stateless nature. Military options are problematic since the groups are unbounded,
transnational, and difficult to pinpoint. Intelligence operations and law enforcement
actions have floundered because of radicalization and lone wolf terrorism, the newest
dimensions of terrorism. Both of these dimensions are hard to counter because they are
so internal, psychological, and isolated. Radicalization is best defined as when an
‘unremarkable’ person becomes a terrorist by means of jihadist ideology that “motivates
young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ‘autonomous jihad’ via
acts of terrorism against their host countries.” 8 It requires self-identification and
indoctrination phases that are not always visible to others. Lone wolf terrorism is a
consequence of radicalization and accounts for 70% of the deaths and 46% of the injuries
from terrorism since 2006. 9 According to the Global Terrorism Index, lone wolf

6

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002-2005, Washington,
D.C. (2006), 34; David J. Kilcullen, "Countering global insurgency," Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4
(2005), 606.
7
Mohammed-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, "ISIS and the Deceptive Rebooting of al
Qaeda," GCSP Policy Paper 5 (2014), 4-5.
8
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat (New
York: Police Department, 2007), 5-6.
9
Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (New
York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), 54.
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terrorism must be an attack occurring in a Western society, no group can have claimed
responsibility for the attack or have been involved in the act, there has to be three or
fewer perpetrators, and there has to be no evidence of external support from a group.
How do modern counterterrorism strategies thus evolve to combat the terrorist
methods of this radical, shifting Islamist ideology? According to Mohammad-Mahmoud
Ould Mohamedou of the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding at the
Graduate Institute of International and Developmental Studies in Geneva,
counterterrorism is best viewed in the plural, requiring a multidimensional analysis of
and approach to counterterrorism. 10 Governmental actions combined with media framing
have promise in helping to understand the gap between evolving terrorism and
counterterrorism and anti-radicalization tactics. Intelligence and especially intelligencesharing are at the core of counterterrorism; they have been a foundation of traditional
counterterrorism strategy and will continue to serve as the primary functionary in
disrupting and thwarting planned terrorist attacks. Educational institutions though can
enforce and dignify counter-radicalization rhetoric in their quotidian interactions with
target audiences as long as they imbue an environment with respect for inalienable
human rights. Furthermore, the media has a duty to provide a window into the world of
terrorism and counterterrorism through which human rights defenders can act and speak.
While history casts a dismal record on the media after events like 9/11, media framing
directly impacts the inclusivity of the community to which it reports, and stigmatization
and prejudicial reactions cannot be a part of that framing.

10

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, interview by Lincoln Gimnich, July 4, 2016.
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Specifically, how have the intelligence communities, educational institutions, and
the media operated in counterterrorism and anti-radicalization strategies thus far, and to
what extent will they interact in future endeavors? Through interviews of experts,
qualitative analysis of governmental documents and publications, and review of existing
relevant literature, I examine specific examples and implications of the current strategies
enacted by security institutions and governments and of the actions of the media to define
the present state of counterterrorism operations. I emphasize intelligence institutions and
transnational and multilateral intelligence operations between nation states with weight
on deeper bilateral agreements, radicalization prevention measures in educational
systems, and advantageous media framing of both terroristic activity and
counterterrorism strategies to mitigate radicalization risks. The future of
counterterrorism strategies must overcome the general trend whereby terrorism evolves
more quickly than counterterrorism; it is irresponsible to wait idly for terrorism to evolve
and then seek potential strategies. Counterterrorism must be proactive rather than
reactive. Ultimately, by understanding the interplay and interaction of these current
methods of counterterrorism in intelligence communities, educational institutions, and
news outlets, definitive strategies are deduced that fuse each of these groups into a
multidimensional approach that can impact the future of counterterrorism in Western
nations, leading to a less terror-ridden global order.
Intelligence Operations
Intelligence is the cornerstone and first-line of defense in countering international
and transnational terrorism. As James Igoe Walsh defines it, intelligence is the
“collection, protection, and analysis of both publicly available and secret information,

10
with the goal of reducing decision makers’ uncertainty about a foreign policy problem.” 11
It gives decision makers new perspectives on terrorism and on the effects of
counterterrorism policy they select. Domestic intelligence institutions have increased,
and domestic intelligence operations have become a vital part of counterterrorism efforts
with the new trends of radicalization and lone wolf terrorism in Western societies.12
Internationally, it is often local regimes and governments who are able to analyze with
the most efficacy the information gathered on terrorist organizations because of common
culture, language, geography, and past experiences. This understanding and subsequent
endemic intelligence necessitates that states share the intelligence they have gathered
through international agreements to curb the goals of the modern wave of terrorism. Yet,
there is also value in intelligence sharing agreements with states who are not part of this
endemic group yet have large capacity and resources such as agreements between the
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).
Since 9/11, Western countries have created numerous domestic intelligence
institutions to help combat terrorist organizations and terror attacks on their soil.
Whether from organized international groups and networks or from radicalized lone wolf
attacks, the responses of the Western world have been relatively standard, as they
primarily have looked for recommendations on how to handle the attack and how to
guard against future attacks. Specifically, after 9/11, the US launched itself into the
metaphoric War on Terror—a war completely disparate from past wars where specific
enemies were targeted over a recognized state. 13 The nature of this “war” proved the

11

James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010), 6.
12
Global Terrorism Index 2015, 55.
13
Hoffman, “Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism,” 314.
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necessity of vital amounts of intelligence and paved the way for Western nation-states to
create institutions like the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the European Counter Terrorism Centre
(ECTC).
Two of the agencies in the US to come out of terrorist attacks were the ODNI and
the NCTC. The ODNI was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 which President Bush signed into law after The 9/11 Commission Report was
published.14 It and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serve as the head of the US
intelligence community. The ODNI acts as the foremost intelligence advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for matters
concerning national security. The NCTC is the primary entity for analyzing intelligence
related to transnational terrorism and has been the most effective in terms of
counterterrorism measures and policy. It is the center for joint operational planning and
joint intelligence-sharing with pre-existing US agencies such as the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and law enforcement. 15 It is the lead
functionary in operational counterterrorism planning as it investigates potential threats,
imparts the information gathered, and integrates all tools of national power. The NCTC
integrates and analyzes intelligence relating to terrorism that the government possesses or
acquires. Serving as the principle advisor to the DNI, it advises on how well US
intelligence activities, programs, and budget proposals on counterterrorism conform to

14

US FBI, Terrorism 2002-2005, 50.
The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon
the United States (Government Printing Office, 2011), 403; “The National Counterterrorism Center,”
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed March 6, 2018,
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-home.
15
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presidential and national priorities. Both of these institutions strive to develop an
institutional culture imbued with deep expertise in intelligence and national security as
they are designed to be the principal mechanisms in combatting terrorism on US soil.
Following the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings and the 2005 London Bombings, the
European Union (EU) sought to increase the national information- and security-sharing
of its member states to help prevent attacks of this magnitude from occurring again. 16
However, after the November 2015 Paris Attacks and the 2016 Brussels Bombings, the
EU pushed to refocus the attention of its counterterrorism measures to more operational
support by Europol and Eurojust in joint activities and less on just intelligence-based
information exchange. The operational outlook prompted the creation of the ECTC. The
ECTC is an organization of Europol that acts as the central information and intelligence
hub for Europe.17 It improves intelligence-sharing, offers members of the EU
operational, technical, and strategic support, and distinguishes the tools that EU member
states have at their disposal in their fight against terrorism. The adoption and
implementation of the ECTC by the EU raises trust and awareness among the involved
intelligence authorities (and thus member-states) and allows them to improve their
counterterrorism operations.
In addition to these three intelligence institutions and conglomerates, law
enforcement in London and New York have developed intelligence-gathering techniques
that make use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) in surveillance systems. Evolving

16
Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, Julien Jeandesboz,
Valsamis Mitsilegas, Francesco Ragazzi, and Amandine Scherrer, “The EU and its Counter-Terrorism
Policies after the Paris Attacks,” Liberty and Security in Europe, no. 84, (2015), 3.
17
Europol, “Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthens the EU's Response to
Terror,” Press Release (2016).
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drastically in ten years, London’s use of CCTV coverage consisted of over 100,000
businesses with 421,931 surveillance cameras and involved at least 500,000 cameras
when public instructions were considered in 2002.18 For example, a £500,000 CCTV
system covers Oxford Street, London’s busiest shopping area, and is monitored from the
Marylebone police station; the Parliamentary Estate also has a CCTV system with over
260 cameras. The implementation of CCTV cameras was originally intended to reduce
and prevent crime in public spaces in London. Law enforcement sought to increase
supervision of areas (i.e., Underground train stations) that were prone to crimes like
assault and theft.19 CCTV camera systems were linked to a network of passenger alarms
and were continuously monitored from a manned and conspicuously located kiosk.
However, today’s CCTV operations revolve around the ‘Ring of Steel’ which began its
installation in 1993 after the Bishopsgate bomb by the Irish Republican Army. 20 The
‘Ring of Steel’ is the city’s defense against carborne terrorism and has effectively shut
down two-thirds of all the streets that used to lead into the city center. At each of the 19
remaining ways to enter the city of London, two CCTV cameras record each driver’s face
and car’s number plate.
In addition to the CCTV system that London has expanded in recent years, New
York implemented a similar system in 2007 called the Lower Manhattan Security

Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, “CCTV in London,” Report deliverable of UrbanEye
project (2002), 20; it is estimated today that there are nearly 1 million CCTV cameras in the city of
London.
19
Barry Webb and Gloria Laycock. "Reducing crime on the London underground." Crime
prevention unit paper 30 (1992), 4.
20
Kieran Long, “So can the secret Ring of Steel save the City from terrorism?,” Evening Standard
(London, England), Oct. 15, 2010. Accessed March 27, 2018. https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/so-canthe-secret-ring-of-steel-save-the-city-from-terrorism-6524967.html.
18
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Initiative (LMSI) and then the Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative (MMSI) in 2010.21
New York is estimated to have a number of cameras that is in the thousands yet is still
significantly dwarfed by those in London.22 The two initiatives cost the New York Police
Department (NYPD) $160 million.23 The LMSI and MMSI combine publicly- and
privately-run video cameras with mobile and static radiation detectors and license plate
readers and make up the Domain Awareness System.24 However, the Domain Awareness
System is unique from what London uses as it forms a completely networked system so
that all CCTV camera feeds can be monitored from a single location in real time. While
London’s system is static, providing only playback capabilities and not real-time
monitoring, the New York system is expected to be more effective at stopping crime and
terror attacks as it allows for real time video analytics. The system is supposed to
identify suspicious behavior before catastrophic events like terror attacks can occur. New
York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly told reporters, “If we’re looking for a
person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red jackets filmed in the last 30 days.”25
While both of these systems seem to adapt to the technologically-evolving world
of terrorism and the world in general, the effectiveness of the systems and the securityprivacy trade off they cause have resulted in upheaval and concern. Proponents claim
that the systems will allow proactive monitoring of suspicious behavior and quicker

21

Greer, Olivia J. "No cause of action: Video surveillance in New York City." Michigan
Telecommunication & Technology Law Review 18 (2011): 591.
22
It is estimated that there is one camera for every fourteen residents in London.
23
Ali Winston, “Secrecy shrouds NYPD’s anti-terror camera system,” City Limits, April 26, 2010,
accessed March 27, 2018, https://citylimits.org/2010/04/26/secrecy-shrouds-nypds-anti-terror-camerasystem/.
24
Fergal Davis, Nicola McGarrity, and George Williams, eds., Surveillance, counter-terrorism
and comparative constitutionalism, Routledge (2014), 119.
25
Greer, “No cause of action,” 589-90.
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apprehension of perpetrators after attacks.26 Such was the case after 9/11 when camera
footage was used to identify the hijackers. However, some terrorists do not wish to elude
identification and do not plan on surviving the attack, rendering this point moot. Major
contradiction also points to the inadequacy and inability of the massive London system to
prevent the 2005 London suicide bombers. After their detonation of bombs in the
London Underground subway system and on a bus, CCTV footage of the perpetrators
entering the Luton Station surfaced.27 What is even more disconcerting though is that
footage of their conducting a “dry run” at the Baker Street Station nine days prior also
surfaced. Definitive examples such as this challenge the efficacy of a surveillance system
that was supposed to notice and thwart such attacks. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier,
the system in New York allows for local law enforcement to recall videos of people in
red jackets.28 What if, though, on the day that local law enforcement were looking for a
red jacket, there were numerous people wearing red jackets that had nothing to do with
the attack? The results would inundate local law enforcement with arbitrary leads since
terrorists often wear rather standard and nondescript garb. Additionally, if someone
happened to be wearing that red jacket and also had brown skin or was praying at a
mosque, would these chance attributes stigmatize innocent people and warrant
questioning on the grounds of stereotypes and biases? The repercussions of this system
could lead to a whole new crisis that pushes more people towards radicalization rather
than towards feelings of safety and inclusion in the community.

Kieran Long, “So can the secret Ring of Steel save the City from terrorism?.”
Pete Fussey, "Observing potentiality in the global city: Surveillance and counterterrorism in
London," International Criminal Justice Review 17, no. 3 (2007), 179
28
The red jacket is a completely arbitrary article of clothing used simply to express a point.
26
27
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In 2009, the NYPD released and adopted the Public Security Privacy Guidelines
that established proper and protective use of the Domain Awareness System and its
stored data.29 Operators of the system are compelled “to refrain from biased targeting, to
monitor only areas in which no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, to refrain from
the use of facial recognition technology, and to require identifying signs on NYPD- and
stakeholder-owned cameras.”30 The Guidelines stipulate that the data is to be only used
for law enforcement purposes, limiting third-party sharing of the data. While the
Guidelines superficially do their job, it gives a wide amount of flexibility to the NYPD in
their usage of the Domain Awareness System, and the Guidelines are not legally
enforceable. Some people question if this lack of protection for privacy as well as against
law enforcement’s overstepping of its boundaries is legal. However, as Chris Dunn,
Associate Legal Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, states, “I know of no
plans by any organization to litigate the presence of surveillance cameras in New York,
and you can read into that the absence of a good legal argument against them.” 31
Pete Fussey, a criminologist at the University of Essex, adequately sums up
surveillance technologies in counterterrorism measures:
…technological provisions such as CCTV are of limited value unless situated within effective
intelligence settings or infrastructures that allow adequate analysis, interpretation, and response to
the captured images, particularly once emphasis is shifted from pre-event deterrence to postevent
detection. Thus, despite the growing prominence of determinist discourses that cite technological
efficacy to avert terrorism, on their own, technological provisions are insufficient. Hence, the
social environment into which strategies are deployed is a crucial variable mediating their
success.32

29
Greer, “No cause of action,” 596; the Public Security Privacy Guidelines will hereto forth be
referred to as the “Guidelines” in congruence with official documentation.
30
Greer, 597.
31
Greer, 606.
32
Fussey, “Surveillance and Counterterrorism in London,” 182-83.
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Fussey ultimately argues that while surveillance technologies seem to be an important
component and potentially the prime component of future counterterrorism measures, the
increase in information they gather must also include proportionate increases in the
capabilities of human agents to analyze meaningfully the information.33 Furthermore,
surveillance technologies need to balance security and privacy. Olivia Greer, an
associate at Weil, Gotshal, and Manges, advocates for legally enforceable regulations in
video surveillance programs to protect privacy rights while also allowing them to do their
intended job.34 Thus, intelligence institutions will best use surveillance technologies for
filtration and aggregation as assistance to the work of human agents in counterterrorism.
Moreover, they must also consider privacy concerns by providing adequate legal
measures to address grievances that may arise.
In addition to domestic operations, international intelligence sharing agreements
are a vital part of the Western counterterrorism strategy yet have been an arduous
struggle to formalize and implement. The subjective nature of reputation within
international law often dictates the structure, process, and compliance of these
agreements between countries. As a mechanism of international law, reputation
encourages states to comply to their agreements and allows states to make more credible
promises and extract greater rewards (i.e., greater intelligence).35 When factoring
reputation into agreement negotiations and construction, states compartmentalize
reputational value; they will revise estimates of reliability and future compliance in
connection with previous agreements that have the same/similar sources of costs and are

33

Fussey, 188.
Greer, “No cause of action,” 619.
35
Andrew T. Guzman, "Reputation and International Law," Georgia Journal of International &
Comparative Law 34 (2005), 381, 383.
34
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valued the same or less. This idea of compartmentalization, by nature, generates stronger
effects in some areas and weaker effects in other areas. Security circles take longer for
reputation to develop and sustain because opportunities to comply are far fewer than in
trade or human rights which are practically quotidian.36
Reputation drives the fundamental nature of intelligence agreements, one that
values trust, compliance, and secrecy. Intelligence networks are inherently characterized
by secrecy, flexibility, and informality, which unfortunately translates over to intelligence
sharing agreements between states and agencies as well; Elizabeth Sepper, associate
professor at the School of Law at Washington University in St. Louis, accurately states
that “intelligence sharing networks are constrained almost exclusively by a shared
professional ethos, rather than law.”37 It is confidence, trust, and perceived benefits that
drive the “soft law approach” of today’s international intelligence sharing agreements as
states rely on enhanced relationships in the fight against terrorism. 38 However, these
values are not mutually exclusive to the drafting of these agreements as some have been
absent when agreements were finalized. In the 1950s, the US shared intelligence with
West Germany despite discomfiting apprehensions about the Nazi pasts of many leaders
in its intelligence services, proving that trust, specifically, is not necessarily essential to
intelligence-sharing.39

36

George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, "Reputation, Compliance, and International
Law," The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002), S112.
37
Elizabeth Sepper, "Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing," Texas International
Law Journal 46 (2010), 151.
38
Stéphane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence
Cooperation," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 4 (2003), 528.
39
Walsh, International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 29.
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Following 9/11, intelligence-sharing required international cooperation to combat
terrorism since the threat and enemy was and still is transnational. 40 Cooperation came
from a number of superregional groups and international organizations. After invoking
Article V of the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
adopted additional measures to combat terrorism and emphasized its function as a key
deterrent to and monitor of defection for its members. Even though there were policy
differences over the 2003 war in Iraq which could have pushed member states to
defection, the Alliance “reaffirmed its commitment to intelligence-sharing…, where
members planned to review intelligence structures.” 41 Furthermore, the United Nations’
(UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 speaks further to the role of
international cooperation in intelligence sharing and countering terrorism. 42 The Strategy
has four pillars: 1) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 2)
preventing and combatting terrorism; 3) building states’ capacities to achieve pillar two
and strengthening the role of the UN in this regard; and 4) ensuring respect for human
rights and the rule of law as the basis in the fight against terrorism. The Strategy was the
first international resolution that prompted member states to cooperate as best as possible
in a coordinated effort to combat terrorism; it put numerous countries on the same side
and provided a commonality by which to share intelligence. However, this liberal
institutionalist approach to intelligence sharing agreements (especially multilateral
intelligence sharing agreements) fails to consider the third-party rule inherent in most of

40
Derek S. Reveron, "Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on
Terror," Orbis 50, no. 3 (2006), 453.
41
Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends,” 461.
42
United Nations, General Assembly, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
(A/RES/60/288, 2006), 3. Official UN documentation now refers to the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
simply as “the Strategy.”
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these agreements.43 The third-party rule stipulates that the involvement of a third-party
(e.g., NATO, the UN) restricts the capacity of the intelligence-sharing because most
states desire to keep their intelligence secret and privy to only those whom they select.
However, intelligence sharing agreements recently have found moderate success
when constructed in the essence of transaction cost economics. Transaction cost
economics selectively joins law, economics, and organization theory, maintaining that
economization of costs and benefits allows “key attributes of transactions and governance
structures be named and the logic of efficient alignment be worked out.”44 In his book
The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, Walsh concludes that hierarchy and
relational contracting, a subfield of transaction cost economics, are the future of most
intelligence-sharing, especially in regard to counterterrorism efforts. 45 According to
Walsh, “relational contracts lead to cooperation only when they are self-enforcing, that is,
when they are designed so that no party has an incentive to renege.” 46 States develop a
hierarchy whereby a dominant state exercises authority in the matter over a subordinate
state in place of a formal third-party institution who would delegate. Relational
contracting allows states to govern their relations in a mutually beneficial manner,
bolstering cooperation and creating more options. Walsh believes that relational
contracting presupposes four expectations in terms of intelligence sharing agreements: 1)
potentially large gains are a necessary condition for intelligence sharing; 2) states will
share intelligence through anarchic institutions; 3) if the incentives for a state to defect

Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends,” 461.
Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics," Handbook of New Institutional
Economics (2005), 61.
45
Walsh, International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 15.
46
Walsh, 16
43
44
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are high but the benefits of sharing are worthwhile, states will construct a hierarchical
relationship to govern intelligence-sharing; and 4) power imbalances are a necessary but
not sufficient condition for creating hierarchy. 47
Ultimately, the construction of the intelligence sharing agreement is a major
factor in how and what type of intelligence is being shared between countries,
intelligence that can impact how a country addresses terrorism within its borders. One of
the prime examples of intelligence sharing agreements is the UKUSA Agreement. In
1946, the UKUSA Agreement was signed between the US National Security Agency and
the British Government Communication Headquarters (i.e., the “first” parties).48
“Second” and “third” parties included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway,
Denmark, West Germany, and Turkey. This agreement is one of the few declassified,
formal intelligence sharing agreements; it has been the basis of US-UK intelligencesharing since its ratification. Experts have deemed it “the most important and resilient
part of British intelligence’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States.” 49 Trust is a
major component of the agreement, and when this trust is damaged or lost, repercussions
are evident. Following the Manchester Bombing terrorist incident in May of 2017, a
series of high profile leaks to the US media of details surrounding the incident caused the
UK to temporarily stop sharing intelligence with the US.50 After promises by President
Donald Trump to investigate the leaks to the US’s greatest ability, UK Prime Minister
Theresa May reinstated intelligence-sharing and called the US-UK relationship their
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“deepest defense and security partnership.” 51 This vignette highlights how important
secrecy and trust is in intelligence sharing agreements. Intelligence has to be kept with
the utmost secrecy, and when that secrecy is broken in some capacity, countries will
withhold their information, even in some of the strongest pacts. When combatting
terrorism, a country cannot loss information flows because it can severely damage the
work of analysts in holistically interpreting data that might indicate an attack.
However, not every country has the deep level of trust and common goals that the
US and the UK have, or they may not have similar resources to justify the same type of
agreement for intelligence-sharing. Often, this situation is with countries who can
provide the best intelligence on terrorist organizations because of common language,
culture, and geography. Agreements with these sorts of countries often follow the
relational contracting construction; states such as Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Uganda, and
Tanzania all have this sort of intelligence-sharing agreement with the US.52 In these
agreements, the US uses financing, oversight, and/or training to control and monitor these
states’ intelligence operations. Intelligence agreements are not necessarily quid pro quo
though. Especially in regard to hierarchical sharing, the dominant state (e.g., the US)
often gives foreign and military aid to the subordinate state in return for intelligence
cooperation.53 Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt are some of the largest recipients of US
military training because of this asymmetrical exchange in intelligence-sharing.54
Furthermore, the US has subsidized the Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence agencies so
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that American officials are closely involved in the treatment and interrogation of
individuals transported to these countries (i.e., extraordinary rendition). 55 While it may
seem that the power dynamics between the dominant and subordinate state are
unbalanced, the subordinate state has power. The subordinate state is often the state
directly interacting with sources of human intelligence because of the endemic
knowledge they have, whether that be of culture, language, or past experiences. They
have the capacity to withhold information, limit American access to/participation in an
interrogation, or stop an interrogation prematurely.
While not billed as an intelligence-sharing agreement or program, the AntiTerrorism Assistance Program (ATA), among other things, trains foreign law
enforcement personnel to respond to and resolve terrorist incidents and investigate and
prosecute those responsible for terrorist acts in countries like Uganda and Tanzania56.
The ATA is a US training mechanism to combat terrorism and encourage intelligencesharing among other countries participating in the ATA. It follows the relational
contracting model for intelligence sharing agreements because of the intelligence that the
US receives and the funding and technical support it provides for the involved countries.
This example especially highlights the efficacy of relational contracting structures
because even in the wider security framework, Uganda and Tanzania were more likely to
comply with and cooperate on intelligence matters than any other dimension within the
counterterrorism regime (e.g., passing anti-terrorism and money laundering legislation,
altering aviation security regulations). 57
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However, a key component in relational contracting is that the benefits of the
agreement must outweigh and offset the incentives to defect. 58 While the US would like
to have some semblance of an intelligence sharing agreement with countries like
Pakistan, Syria, or Iran because of their endemic knowledge, this sort of success is
probably untenable. The US has repeatedly attempted to create hierarchical sharing with
Pakistan because of the high value of intelligence it has; however, disparate domestic
political concerns and professional culture within Pakistan and its intelligence service
(Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) have raised too high a potential for defection such that
the benefits do not offset the costs.59 Furthermore, in the past, the US has lightly
considered establishing hierarchical intelligence-sharing relationships with Syria and
Iran. However, the costs have been deemed too high as profound policy differences are
the major barrier to intelligence sharing and trusting the content of what would be shared.
While historically, intelligence has been shared between the US and these two countries,
it was in times of a common, immediate threat (a case-by-case basis), and the agreements
were never institutionalized in formal intelligence sharing agreements.60
Intelligence operations form the bulk of counterterrorism strategy. Domestic
operations encompass institutional sharing and surveillance technologies that have
unsteady success. The technologically oriented future requires intelligence operations to
adapt appropriately, yet intelligence institutions have not found the best and most utile
approach to surveillance technologies that works and addresses privacy concerns.
Intelligence institutions have utilized intelligence sharing agreements as a means to
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expand the intelligence to which analysts and policymakers have access. Trust and
relational contracting pragmatically explain the structure of current US intelligence
sharing agreements, and these two frameworks will be crucial considerations for future
agreements that are made with other Western states and with countries that have endemic
knowledge about terrorist organizations and operations.
Educational Institutions
Fueled by the numerous terrorist attacks in the Western world, the UK parliament
resorted to an amalgam of methods that embraced various aspects like military operations
and intelligence gathering and sharing of traditional counterterrorism strategy. However,
the UK began to realize that traditional counterterrorism strategy is not and will not be
effective against the developing IS, a nontraditional opponent that is transnationally
bounded. To approach this issue, the British Parliament developed and implemented a
national counterterrorism strategy called CONTEST in 2003.61 It since has gone through
numerous revisions, culminating in the most recent version that was enacted in 2011. A
major focus of this strategy was counter-radicalization and deradicalization. Two of the
core pillars of CONTEST—Prevent and Channel—accentuate the counter-radicalization
and deradicalization rhetoric that the UK is using to fight against terrorism. However, the
efficacy of these programs has been called into question as they have spurred intense
backlash from students, human rights groups, and educators across the UK, claiming
unethical practice and demanding individual protection from discrimination in the
classroom.
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CONTEST aims to “reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from
terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.” 62
CONTEST seeks to achieve this aim through four workstreams, referred to by officials as
the ‘four P’s.’ They include Pursue, Protect, Prepare, and Prevent. Pursue works to
stop terrorist attacks in the UK and against her interests overseas through three means: 1)
detection and investigation of threats as early as possible; 2) disruption of terrorist
activity before it can endanger the public; and 3) prosecution of the responsible
perpetrators wherever possible. 63 Protect seeks to strengthen the protection against a
domestic and/or overseas terrorist attack and to reduce vulnerability. 64 It strives to devote
more resources to border security, identification technology, and coordination of law
enforcement agencies and responses. The third workstream, Prepare, is designed to
mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack when the attack cannot be deterred or stopped. 65
Its goal is to build coordinated generic resiliency to recover from terrorist attacks. These
three pillars focus on external threats of terrorism and how the nation-state itself can
survive and mitigate the effects of terrorism.
The fourth workstream of CONTEST—Prevent—is where the UK’s educational
counterterrorism strategy roots itself. Prevent focuses on the radicalization of British
citizens and the supposedly “direct” transition from extremism to terrorism. Prevent is
viewed as the paramount framework of CONTEST as it espouses often the root cause of
lone-wolf and radicalized terrorism. Prevent has three primary objectives. It responds to
the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat of those who promote it, prevents
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people from being drawn into terrorism with appropriate advice and support, and works
with a wide range of sectors where there are risks of radicalization. 66 The third objective
requires cooperation between the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in
the Home Office and sectors like faith, charities, the internet, and most notably education.
Prevent hopes to have “no ‘ungoverned spaces’ in which extremism is allowed to flourish
without firm challenge and legal intervention.” 67 It wants to discourage people from
viewing terrorism as a legitimate means to an end, and in the vein of Prevent,
radicalization occurs where terrorist ideologies can bloom without contestation and are
not subjugated to free, open, and balanced debate and challenge. Prevent underlines the
desire to contain and challenge radicalization and thus minimize national security risks.
Objective two of Prevent underscores the means by which professionals are to
thwart the process of radicalization. The primary method is through conjunction with the
Channel program. Channel is a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that
“evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism” and that works
“alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels.” 68 Channel is a
mechanism for assessing and supporting people who are being drawn into violent
extremism or are being targeted by violent extremists.69 Through Prevent, teachers and
school staff are to refer these individuals to a chief police officer who would then refer
them to a panel of experts and practitioners. This can only be done if there are
“reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is vulnerable to being drawn into
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terrorism.”70 The panel develops support packages for referred individuals based on an
assessment of their vulnerability. The most challenging portion of Channel revolves
around the referral system; demarcating what behaviors and indicators should be taken to
be a sign of vulnerability or radicalization has proven to be a feat for these professionals.
Some of the indicators that Channel designates are expressed opinions in favor of
violence and terrorism and against the rule of law and government; possession of or
access to violent extremist literature and imagery or material regarding military training
or weapons; behavioral changes like withdrawal from social atmospheres and hostility;
and a history of involvement with extremist organizations.71 Educators and school staff
are presented with some materials that explain these indicators and behaviors and what
constitutes the need for referral. The referral process is linear and follows the pattern of
identification, screening referrals, preliminary assessments, multi-agency panels, and
delivery of support.72 Individuals can be deemed as not at risk or vulnerable in both the
screening referral and preliminary assessment stages.
Ultimately, the UK wants sectors to be able to have effective responses to
terrorism, and the government views education as a vital institution that prepares young
people to challenge extremism and the ideology of terrorism. In the most recent version
of Prevent, the UK government delineates how primary schools, secondary schools, and
higher education institutions should combat radicalization. In primary and secondary
schools, the UK Department of Education and the OSCT has funded programs that raise
awareness of the risks from violent extremism and provide guidance on the development
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of positive and inclusive rhetoric on democratic values and human rights with nearly 4.7
million pounds overall and regionally 950 thousand pounds. 73 Additionally, the
Association of Chief Police Officers worked to produce the guidance document of
“PREVENT, Police, and Schools” which aims to help police officers work with teachers
and school staff. From this program, the “Act Now” initiative emerged to help teachers
and school staff understand debates that may be had in their classrooms and school
settings through simulated debates on violent extremism. The program “Watch Over
Me” helped secondary schoolteachers discuss challenging topics like terrorism. From
these programs and initiatives, teachers have been provided with resources that they
should use in effectuating their role in anti-radicalization and Prevent.
In higher education, Prevent distinctly does not wish to limit or interfere with the
free flow of ideas that champion higher education institutions and discussion. Alongside
Prevent research, the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills identified forty
English universities where there was particular concern or risk of radicalization or
recruitment on campus, at which point the universities were given the opportunity to
assess their ability to manage the risk. 74 Subsequently, these universities were given
intelligence briefings and small grants to further the work of Prevent. Many of these
universities now have a dedicated police officer on campus to advise on these issues.
Major concerns about the skill and confidence of staff to deal with radicalization are still
rampant in the higher education sector specifically. Very few specific programs and
initiatives have been enacted to aid higher educators in their determent of radicalization.
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However, the Home Office has recently released an online e-learning training
module, meant to address the fundamentals of Prevent.75 The training exercise addresses
the roles that numerous individuals have in the program and tailors the eight parts to the
individual that is participating, based on your geographic region, occupational sector, and
role in that sector (e.g., primary school teacher, administrative staff, teaching assistant).
Through the use of interactive exercises, the training emphasizes potential signs for
radicalization, particularly noting the psychological factors such as emotions and
behaviors that put people at risk. While it does mention that the risk for radicalization is
lower than for drug and alcohol abuse and peer pressure, it fails to consider the
multifinality of the factors it uses. Some of the behaviors and emotions that it says are
signs of the radicalization process include absenteeism, isolation from friends and family,
quick to anger, becoming detached or withdrawn, signs of stress, and unhealthy use of the
internet. These factors can all point to other things in a person’s life such as mental
illness (i.e., depression and anxiety), abuse of some form, or addiction. Just because a
student may be expressing some of these factors does not indicate that they are being
radicalized or are even at risk of radicalization. Yet, the training requires you to put
radicalization as a key factor in what is driving the actions of students in the case studies.
Furthermore, the training lays out the process of radicalization but assumes that extremist
viewpoints and thoughts lead to terrorism, a conveyor belt theory that is an inherent
design flaw in not only this training module but Prevent as a whole. The training lacks
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grounded evidence and actions for teachers to take, instead emphasizing that they should
use professional judgment and common sense and also consider the context of the
actions.
In November of 2017, the Home Office divulged what they described as
experimental statistics around the success, demographics, and reasoning behind referrals
within the Prevent program in the 2015-2016 fiscal year.76 According to these models,
approximately 7,631 individuals were subject to referrals due to concerns that they were
being drawn into terrorism, were being radicalized, or had been radicalized. The
education sector accounted for the most referrals (33%), while the police accounted for
31%. This finding clearly indicates that the two main sectors that Prevent is trying to
bolster in their counter-radicalization efforts are educational institutions and the police.
Of the 7,631 individuals referred, only 1,072, or 14%, were deemed suitable to be passed
on to the Channel program. 77 Of those 1,072 individuals, only 381 subsequently received
support through the program of which 365 had left the Channel process after officials
deemed their vulnerability as successfully reduced. Of the initial 7,631, 4,997 (67%)
were referred to Prevent for concerns related to Islamist extremism. 78 Right wing
extremism, other forms of extremism, and “unspecified” account for the remaining 33%.
Of the 1,072 discussed at a Channel panel, 819 (76%) were there because of concerns of
Islamist extremism, and 264 subsequently received Channel support.
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Throughout Prevent, Channel, and CONTEST as a whole, upholding human
rights seems to be at the apex of discussion. Continually, CONTEST hinges its success
in counterterrorism work on if it is “effective, proportionate and consistent with [the
UK’s] commitment to human rights.” 79 Prevent commits to protecting freedom of speech
in a tolerant, welcoming, and safe environment. 80 Channel puts human rights in the
center of its support packages, exploring the idea that greater knowledge about “political
engagement, civil challenge, human rights, social justice and citizenship” would be
advantageous and beneficial to vulnerable individuals.81 However, the extent to which
this is true is vigorously opposed by numerous institutions, public figures, nongovernmental organizations, and educators themselves. The public backlash against
these programs is tremendous and at the forefront after major attacks outmaneuver these
enacted policies. People begin to question the civil liberty-national security tradeoff and
the efficacy of the programs if they are not doing what they are designed to do.
According to Richard A. Posner, an American jurist and economist, “Rights should be
curtailed to the extent that the benefits in greater security outweigh the costs in reduced
liberty.”82 Thus, in times of national insecurity, people are willing to relinquish some of
their civil liberties and human rights if it is in the name of national security.
The highest point of contention revolves around the referral system and the
environment that Prevent engenders. Prevent forces teachers to subsume a dual post
where they are doing their traditional job of educating their students but also are acting as
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a surrogate and contact for the intelligence and security communities. According to
Aislinn O’Donnell, a professor at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth,
educators should be autonomous from the security and intelligence agendas.83 The
training that educators go through is inadequate at best since it is no more than a few
hours of video on what is considered suspect behavior. Russell Hobby, the general
secretary of the National Association of Head Teachers, stated, “Teachers are not
counter-terrorism experts, have no wish to be ancillary members of the security service
and lack the training to do it well even if they did.” 84 Moreover, schools do not know
what their full obligations are and are concerned about being seen as taking action and
complying.85 The combination of these two mindsets has “engendered a culture of overreferral and excessive scrutiny.” Prevent and Channel are causing young students to be
fearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression and belief for fear that what
they say may be misconstrued as supporting violent extremism and terrorism. 86 The most
disconcerting point, though, is that this process could be utterly counter-productive. As
students feel restricted on what they can freely speak about in classroom settings, they
gravitate towards having discussions on issues related to terrorism, religion, and identity
outside of the classroom and online where simplistic narratives like those used by
terrorist organizations are spouted and go unchallenged.
Furthermore, there are inherent design problems in the structure of Prevent that
critically damage its validity. Since Prevent relies on educators to act as a first
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correspondent for counterterrorism policy, many educators feel like they are being coopted to serve this mission and have subsequently objected. 87 In March of 2016, the
National Union of Teachers passed a motion rejecting Prevent, saying they would not act
as the “Secret Service of the public sector.” Also, Prevent leaves so much up to the
discretion of the schools that there is no guarantee for consistency and predictability;
there is an absence of clear instructions as to what form of intervention is appropriate and
when a risk assessment is triggered. Furthermore, the indicators of Channel often
correlate poorly with potential terrorist activity and are overbroad in scope and
ambiguous in meaning. This causes over-referral without concrete justification. In the
2015-2016 fiscal year, 36% of the individuals referred to Prevent left the process
requiring no further action, suggesting a gross over-referral without adequate cause or
justification.88 Only 14% of those referred to Prevent were passed on to Channel.
The most intriguing design flaw though rests in the connection between
extremism and terrorism. Channel and Prevent assess the vulnerability of an individual
becoming a terrorist by means of their association with extremism. 89 It posits that
extremism and terrorism are on a continuum and support for extremism is a reliable
indicator for future participation in terrorism. Interestingly enough, the movement and
path from extremism to terrorism is what the UK defines as radicalization. However, this
linear approach is widely criticized. Ben Emmerson QC, a UN Special Rapporteur on
human rights and counterterrorism, more succinctly describes this path as “individualized
and non-linear, with a number of common ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors but no single
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determining feature.”90 Furthermore, Prevent defines extremism as opposed to so-called
‘British values.’91 This definition is vague at best and fails to take into account the liquid
and constantly reshaping British identity. Some critics argue that this overly-simplistic
understanding of “extreme” is McCarthyistic in nature and is further marginalizing the
Muslim community in the UK.92
In addition to the inherent design problems of Prevent, students and educators
alike have dramatically voiced their opinions against Prevent and its implications for the
student-teacher relationship. In 2015, the National Union of Students (NUS) called for a
boycott of Prevent, citing its counter-radicalization strategy to monitor students and the
subsequent impact on freedom of expression on campuses as its impetus. 93 The NUS
launched a national tour in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, and Swansea,
and the University and College Union—the largest trade union for lecturers and
academics in higher education—backed the boycott, pledging support for any branch that
decided to formally boycott the implementation of Prevent. This boycott was part of the
Students Not Suspects movement which campaigns against the discriminatory duties that
affect ‘suspect’ communities. Yusuf Hassan, the vice-president of student affairs of an
umbrella group representing 15,000 Muslim students in higher education, said, “Terms
such as radicalization have not been defined or quantified…It is not, nor should it be
within the ability of a student or a lecturer to report on extremism or people showing
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it.”94 Furthermore, Rizwaan Sabir, a specialist in counterterrorism at the Liverpool John
Moores University, claims that the act creates a climate of fear, self-censorship and a
danger that innocent people may be seen as future terrorists.
Educators have also presented major concerns in regard to the effects that Prevent
has had on their relationship with students and on the classroom environments it has
created. For O’Donnell, Prevent damages relations of trust and openness because of the
alienation, disaffection, and disengagements that it imbues. 95 She believes that if Prevent
continues limiting free speech, it may drive those with radical views off campus and
underground, countering its purpose. How can we effectively combat radicalization in
educational institutions if those people who are “vulnerable” are not there? It has become
increasingly difficult for educators and students alike to know what one is permitted to
say and discuss in the classroom. O’Donnell argues for a shift to the Greek concept of
parrhesia, or fearless speech. 96 Parrhesia is the ability to disclose courageously the truth
about oneself to other people without the fear of repercussions. Students need
environments where they work through their views openly with contestation, reflection,
and enquiry. It allows for the exploration of these difficult topics but only when there is a
symbiotic relationship of trust between the educator and the student. Furthermore,
educators cannot strive to directly change the world view of students by encouraging
them to adopt a new world view. Most students will resist and resent this; transformation
should occur by creating the conditions for the world to open to the student. 97 Imposition
of an idea on students damages the delicate relationship of trust and the possibility of
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creativity and autonomy on subject matter. Students should regard education and the
classroom as a space of open dialogue and free speech if Prevent is to garner
transformation and questioning within that environment.
Furthermore, there are clear instances where the counter-radicalization and
deradicalization efforts of Prevent have ultimately failed. Some of the perpetrators of
both the June 2017 London Bridge terror attack and the Parsons Green subway bombing
in September of the same year are known to have direct connections to the Prevent
program.98 In June of 2017, three assailants drove a rented van into a crowd of
pedestrians on the London Bridge and then used knives to attack patrons of restaurants
and pubs in the Borough Market. In September, a homemade bomb partially exploded in
subway train at the Parsons Green station for which three assailants were arrested.
Khuram Shazad Butt, a perpetrator in the June attack, and Ahmed Hassan, a perpetrator
in the September attack, were both referred to Prevent for extremism and radicalization
concerns. So, what do these successful attacks say about Prevent? Ultimately, the
system has failed. Radicalized terrorists are thwarting the system and successfully
carrying out attacks even after referral. Whether they were radicalized at the time of
referral or not, it highlights immensely the need for more efficacious measures in
determining how vulnerable someone may be to radicalization.
With these human rights issues, design flaws, educator and public concerns, and
failures of the system itself, how can CONTEST, Prevent, and Channel evolve to
accommodate future changes in the context of educational institutions? Many advocates
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and educators have pushed for the development of curricula that prevents radicalization
in a similar manner to how educational institutions currently combat drugs, gang
violence, and alcohol. 99 Often, discussion of terrorism, extremism, and radicalization can
be a minefield for teachers because of prejudice among students, but that cannot detract
from the role of an educator. Teachers sometimes prefer to safeguard from potential
prejudiced discussion that could occur rather than from potential terrorist attacks. 100
Thus, there needs to be more clarity on the expectations and requirements regarding this
safeguarding and further on how teachers and educators address this. A set of standards
needs to be explicitly defined for educators’ obligations regarding extremism, and the
government must ensure that teachers and school staff know what to do when they see
signs of radicalization.
Schools need to ensure balanced debate as well as freedom of speech. Their
environments should create spaces for sensitive questioning and exploration of issues that
affect students’ daily lives. 101 University staff must be aware of the decisions they make
on guest lecturers and external speakers to ensure open environments but also to ensure
that propagandistic material is not being spouted. Student societies and universities
should be given the right information and guidance to make these decisions correctly. 102
At the university level especially, the government needs to address the lack of
engagement by schools and universities. The reconstruction of the program so that it
better aligns with the goals of educational institutions will aid this, but grants would also
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incentivize engagement and implementation of Prevent and Channel. Prevent also
should ameliorate community cohesion by creating better links between schools,
universities, colleges, local authorities, and community entities. They should work to
reduce the risk of exposure to extremist and terrorist ideology outside of school hours.
Some of the greatest revisions need to focus on teacher training. Regardless of
teacher apprehension against the referral system of Prevent and Channel, it cannot be
improved without adequate and ample training for teachers and school staff. They must
know how to react when they see signs of radicalization. Current training only informs
teachers of their duty under Prevent guidelines and does not include practical actions and
detailed information. First and foremost, specific indicators and behaviors need to be
established if possible, and it cannot revert to generalities. These indicators and
behaviors need to have significant backing in psychological studies that indicate that
these signs are more likely than not indicators for radicalization or risk of it. Greater
training time that is more than just a video should be devoted to educators; teachers and
school staff should be attending workshops and seminars as well so that they are properly
trained. Furthermore, teachers must also feel as if they can speak freely and honestly in
line with the idea of parrhesia without subordinating education to other agendas like
those of security and counterterrorism. 103
Ultimately, the best path for the education-based counterterrorism strategies of
Prevent is a humanitarian endeavor that seeks to highlight discussion and learning. When
educational institutions are used as a means for finding the radicalized or individuals
vulnerable to radicalization, it undermines the fundamental principle of education. It
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subordinates the original intent of learning to a security precept where educators are more
of a watchdog than anything else. It is also negligent to replace traditional education with
education designed to inculcate a certain ideology. Samuel Walters, speaking of terrorist
organizations in Afghanistan, says, “If the organizations are approaching the recruitment
of new terrorists through the…technique of taking in a somewhat disenfranchised youth
and slowly ‘grooming’ them through meetings and propaganda-like education, then an
opposite form of education could be a viable counter action to recruitment activities.” 104
While this is referring to counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, this method can be
applied to Western, national counterterrorism strategy as well. Even though extremists
and terrorists focus on propaganda, recruitment at a young age, and social organizations
at schools and universities, a humanitarian, anti-propaganda approach will be
advantageous to combatting the ideological challenge of terrorism. Furthermore,
providing every individual access to education that effectively fosters an environment of
debate, critical thinking and enquiry, and openness towards complex issues like
extremism and terrorism will reduce the possibility of recruitment to a brand of
religiously-inspired terrorism that rests outside of and distinct from the rest of the
religious community.105 Drawing from established and developed pedagogical discourse
on anti-racism, educators could replicate these methods and then apply similar techniques
to anti-terrorism discourse. Racism and terrorism parallel each other as they are both
seen as sensitive issues, and since anti-racism education is more pedagogically developed
and ensured than that for terrorism, it would be a good starting point to apply effective
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methods directly into the classroom. This humanitarian approach to education-based
counterterrorism will give students more scope to engage in critical and academic
discussion that traces the roots and causes of terrorism.
Overall, CONTEST, Prevent, and Channel have undermined a crucial aspect of
basic human rights that is only acceptable in the most minute of circumstances.
Prevent’s design problems question how well this strategy can be effectively
implemented in sectors like education where there is severe backlash from students,
educators, and staff alike. Prevent, to them, makes suspect an entire community while
also limiting rights of expression and religion; David Anderson QC said, “There is a
strong feeling in Muslim communities…that Prevent is, if not a spying programme, then
is at least a programme that is targeted on them.” 106 The intense outcry and disapproval
of the program has spurred the need for a revision of the program that ameliorates clear
guidance and curricula on expectations and implementation, the autonomy of the
educational space, and the teacher training of the guidelines. Some have even called for
its being rebranded as the ‘Engage Programme’. These education strategies, though,
should migrate to a more humanitarian approach that seeks to emphasize the function of
education.
The Media
Publicity has long been a fundamental factor of terrorism but has gained explosive
usage and clout with the rise in new media technologies.107 Since 9/11 specifically, the
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unfortunate role of the media has been to promulgate this ideological factor of terrorism,
whether knowingly or unknowingly. 108 Terrorist organizations disperse information and
propaganda through myriad media outlets, emphasizing their use of social media
platforms especially. However, according to Philip Seib, “If terrorist organizations draw
their support from a large public, they should not be allowed to access that public without
competition from those who want to bring terrorism to an end.” 109 Often overlooked, the
media has also played an integral part in the countering of terrorism, utilized as a key
counterterrorism bulwark by numerous agencies and governments against terrorist
organizations but also as a key factor in protecting national security.
The greatest pushback to the implementation and utilization of such a behemoth
of an industry into the counterterrorism enterprise, though, comes from questions
regarding basic human rights. The intersection of counterterrorism strategy and the
media aims to protect the national integrity of a country and its people but must also
hinge around the idea of civil liberties enunciated in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. After major attacks such as the 2004 Madrid Bombings, the 2005
London Bombings, and the November 2015 Paris Attacks, national insecurity and the
idea of national insecurity induces Western governments to encroach on basic civil
liberties like the rule of law and freedom of speech while the media’s subservient and
fearmongering tactics further perpetuate this insecurity, demeaning its role in public and
governmental oversight. Thus, as terrorism remains a viable and advantageous option for
several transnational organizations, the future of counterterrorism must, at least partially,
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root itself in ethical considerations of media-based strategies that venerate and sustain the
information-promulgation function of the media.
As the world has become more interconnected and information has become more
widely available to the public, the media has essentially become another cog in the liberal
democratic machine that runs many Western states. It allows the public to have greater
and more direct access to the process of democracy and the policies enacted to protect
them. While the traditional balance of power in liberal democracies falls to the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, the media is effectively
another major actor in this balance, serving as a voice for the public. Therefore, how the
media and the government frame terrorism to the public determines whether terrorism
and terrorists will destroy more than just lives and buildings but also the foundations of
our rights and freedoms. Jack Snyder of Columbia University states, “Democratic
regimes make attractive targets for terrorist violence by national liberation movements
precisely because they are accountable to a cost-conscious electorate.”110 Conclusive
evidence suggests that the reporting of terrorist operations and attacks by news agencies
leads to the perpetuation of violence, especially since terrorist organizations use these
agencies and their own media to promote their agendas.111 This phenomenon seriously
questions if terrorists should be given the “oxygen of publicity.” 112 Alternatively, the
media has a basic right and a civic duty to inform the public of these committed
atrocities, acting as the guardian and distributer of information to the modern masses.
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Political communication between governmental policy makers and the public situates
mass media as the gate-keeper of access to news and to these participating parties. 113 The
key is to find the middle point where the media is able to institute freedom of speech and
of the press but does not engender an environment where people are deprived of their
freedom from fear.
A recent study by Michael Jetter confirmed the horrific truth behind media
representation of terrorism and other acts of terror: more news attention predicts future
attacks.114 News attention functions as an incentive for terrorists and the propagation of
their objectives which explains the recent exponential augmentation in suicide attacks,
lone-actor attacks, and more large-scale organized attacks. Unfortunately, this
correlation also functions in reverse as terrorism causes news attention, drafting countries
into an inflationary spiral where terror is ever-perpetuated. His findings thus challenge
how the media needs to effectively operate in this reciprocal realm. Jetter enunciated his
final conclusion from the study in an interview with The Guardian where he stated,
“What this article is suggesting is that we may need to rethink the sensationalist coverage
of terrorism and stop providing terrorists a media platform.” 115 Jetter undoubtedly
suggests that the media is not engendering societies to have freedom from fear but rather
is following a fearmongering approach.
This sensationalist approach that has characterized numerous news cycles recently
plays a particularly insidious role in terrorism framing for the public. For minority
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groups, sensationalized media representation has led to the idea of “suspectification”
which hopes to detect “suspect” individuals and behaviors in society. 116 However, this
has translated into overgeneralization by both the public and news agencies, leading to
“suspect communities.” Many journalists in the media feel the need to distance
themselves from political violence by deploying strong, pejorative language like “evil,”
“fanatics,” and “barbaric” to the perpetrators of violence, and they also have frequently
juxtaposed the press coverage of moderates with that of extremists which unintentionally
has begun to blur the boundaries between the two groups. 117 This has caused massive
backlash against moderates who are found in these supposed “suspect communities,”
with many claiming that the media is in some way responsible for the verbal and physical
abuse they encounter in everyday situations. 118 These “suspect communities” do not
have a freedom from discrimination because of the rhetoric of the media. Looking back
at the data from Prevent referrals, Muslims in the UK had a 1-in-500 chance of being
referred in 2015, which is approximately forty times more likely than non-Muslims.119
Furthermore, Muslim communities in particular have admitted that there is a state of
fearfulness which has promoted divergent responses of feelings of alienation to various
forms of politicization in Muslims.
For majority groups (or terrorist outgroups which may be a more apt description),
sensationalized media of terrorism has actually perpetuated Islamophobia. When
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networks continually cover terror attacks in grandiose fashions, psychological distress in
individuals causes emotional and mental imbalances, prejudicial reactionary principles,
and exclusionist attitudes to evolve rampantly. 120 Following a terrorist attack,
psychological distress is incredibly high in people who view the attack as an attack
against their ingroup, and sensationalized coverage only exacerbates this effect. This
effect has been evident since at least the 9/11 attacks when the newest wave of terrorism
commenced and when Islamist extremism came to the forefront. While it is unfair to say
that the media is the cause of Islamophobia as psychological studies indicate that it is the
attack itself that burgeons it, it is a fair assessment to say that the media has been an
indiscriminate disseminator and perpetuator of the idea. 121 News agencies do a poor job
of depicting what Islam is, portraying it as “entirely unidimensional and monolithic;”
they have avoided the diversity and difference of opinion that exists within Islam and
Islamism.122 It unfortunately has led to unfettered racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia
in Western societies.
However, the media cannot stop reporting terrorism on its own accord and cannot
be ordered to stop reporting terrorism by the government or other overseeing
organizations. These actions would infringe upon the freedom of the press, and the
media is a vital part of the information exchange necessary to ratify the social contract
between the government and the public. In liberal democracies, media gate-keepers
permit and promote the dissemination of information and communication between the
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citizenry and the elected and appointed government officials. Brigitte Nacos designates
this information exchange as the “Triangle of Political Communication” (see figure 1).123
The “Triangle” effectively connects the public to the government yet unfortunately
systematically publicizes the propagandistic messages of terrorism to the other parties in
the “Triangle” as well. Even though terrorists may exploit the fundamental tenets and
responsibilities of the media, the government cannot polarize this phenomenon by
restricting the freedom of expression and speech that the media is ensured.

Figure 1. Terrorism, the Triangles of Political Communication, and the Internet in Brigitte Nacos,
“Terrorism/counterterrorism and media in the age of global communication” (2006), 4.
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with factual, applicable information or when they use fear and media manipulation as a
political tool.125 How then does the media successfully work in conjunction with the
government to address counterterrorism while also being a window for the public and for
defenders of human rights to speak, all while not following fearmongering tactics? But
more importantly, has today’s media adhered to this ideal etiquette?
In initiating media-based counterterrorism strategy, the media seems to follow the
inundation of public outbursts of patriotism and subsequently emulates it at the expense
of its watchdog responsibilities. 126 Media representation of counterterrorism revolves
almost exclusively on the leaders of the nation, propagating a “rally-‘round-the-flag
phenomenon” where the press places extraordinary attention on the rhetoric of leaders in
times of crises. This focalization of news attention gives state leaders the clout to affect
and set the news agenda of the perceived crisis, and that power is where the curtailing of
civil liberties begins. However, not solely limited to and caused by this governmental
influence, the media also has an insatiable desire to concentrate only on the militaristic
counterterrorism responses rather than non-violent methods being implemented. This
voracious appetite for sensational news conjoined with governmental influence causes the
media to avert “reporting about…encroachments on civil liberties and human rights.”127
The relationship between the military, military secrets, the media, and the First
Amendment has been consistently precarious in eras where national security is a concern.
At times, the relationship between the national security apparatus and the press is
symbiotic; other times, it is antagonistic. 128 Both systems though have the tantamount
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goals of protecting democratic values and national freedom, but the extent to which they
disseminate and exchange information is what provides the symbiotic-antagonistic
nature. After the development of the Sidle Commission during the Grenada Operation in
1983, the military approached its press interactions with the ideology that “it [was]
essential that the US news media cover US military operations to the maximum degree
possible consistent with mission security and the safety of US forces.” 129 After major
military operations in the late twentieth century, it was easy to discern that mutual
antagonism and distrust were not in the best interests of the media, the military, nor the
American people. This newfound principle of partial, understood cooperation continues
today in the media and military operations and relations. Thus, journalists and news
organizations today must find the balance of patriotism and professionalism in their
coverage of counterterrorism strategy in the military so as not to be a detriment to
national security but to be an instrument to the tasks of citizenship in regard to the social
contract.130
Following 9/11, the Bush Administration implemented numerous security
measures to combat terrorism which the media magnified disproportionately. The media
tended to highlight only the shocking, sensationalized, and disconcerting news of the day.
For example, after the introduction of the Homeland Security Advisory System, networks
covered the raising of the alert system from yellow to orange in a headliner position. 131
The three major news networks—CBS, ABC, and NBC—spent on average five minutes
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and twenty seconds on this news segment. 132 Conversely, when the alert was reduced
from orange to yellow ten days later, these networks only spent one minute and thirtyfour seconds covering it, and the majority of these segments were not in headliner
positions. The media effectively downplayed the lowering of these alerts or did not cover
them at all, keeping the fear of terrorism alive in the minds of Americans who did not pay
close attention to the news cycle. This further supports the insinuation that the media
generated and contributed to what Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro referred to as a
“culture of hysteria” where fear conditioned Americans to rally around the president
while silencing possible opponents. 133
Furthermore, in addition to the military responses in Afghanistan, the Bush
Administration curtailed civil liberties with the drafting, legislation, and implementation
of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) which expanded the “federal
government’s surveillance and intelligence gathering powers.” 134 Rather than focusing
on this curbing of civil liberties and human rights infringements though, news focused on
the process by which it was being put through Congress and subsequently enacted. 135
The media relinquished its role as an information window, avoiding the complex legal
issues and privacy violations that the USA Patriot Act presented. News agencies decided
to express their patriotism by only agreeing with the government rather than posing
questions, raising concerns, and voicing dissent which are more essential to the national
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interests of the public.136 It chose to report only rather than to examine and did not
provide holistic information for the public, floundering in its role as the gate-keeper.
As the USA Patriot Act encroached on basic civil liberties and human rights like
the right to privacy and the freedom from discrimination, the Bush Administration also
used its clout to set the media agenda, preventing free discussion and questioning of these
counterterrorism measures.137 The media gave priority attention to members of the
Administration and other prominent figures in the terrorism and counterterrorism arenas.
When reporting on civil liberties encroachment and the USA Patriot Act, media coverage
had a formulaic design where an anchor would give a neutral description of the issue at
hand, followed by someone arguing in favor of the issue (typically President George
Bush or Attorney General John Ashcroft) and ending with only a mention of opposition
from organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union. 138 Additionally, when it was
the administration’s intention and as long as they gave press conferences, speeches, and
interviews, news agencies were more than willing to give them frequent and prominent
coverage which would permit that agenda setting and news domination by the
government.139
However, the media did move itself into a more subjective arena after the
atrocities at the Abu Ghraib Prison emerged in 2004.140 The media regained some of its
independence from the governmental agenda setting as it and the public began to
question the security-civil liberties trade-off. In times of great threat, the public is willing
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to consent to curbs of civil liberties for the sake of enhanced collective and individual
security, and “the greater people’s sense of threat, the lower their support for civil
liberties.”141 Therefore, when the Abu Ghraib brutalities emerged, people’s sense of
threat from 9/11 had diminished drastically, and they no longer felt the need to have such
a degree of curtailment. Yet, this shift had too little coverage of the appalling violations
of civil liberties and human rights of particular groups too late. As Justice Potter Stewart
wrote, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an
enlightened citizenry…For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware,
and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the first amendment. For without an
informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.” 142 A vibrant, free press
holds the government to account and is thus vitally important to the well-being of our
nation and its human rights record. 143 The media must maintain its freedom of speech
and press to allow people the information to protect the values of democracy and human
rights alike regardless of political clout and sway.
By strict adhesion to the information promulgation role, the media will be another
form of checks and balances for the government, reporting and voicing the dissenting
and/or agreeing opinions of the public. In achieving this role, news agencies must be
aware of the dangers of characterizing communities as “harboring extremists, responsible
for solving the problem of terrorism, and split between the law-abiding, moderate
majority and the criminal, extremist minority” and must avoid extreme and pejorative
language and terminology in its reporting. 144 This fourth actor in the checks and balances
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system emphasizes what is known as public diplomacy whereby a greater entity such as a
government, a multinational corporation, or a non-governmental organization reaches out
to the public.145 The media facilitates a large portion of the dialogue evident in public
diplomacy, especially newer forms of media like social media and YouTube. 146 Today’s
public has gradually transitioned from an “authority-driven” world to an “experiencedriven” world, accentuating how the availability of information has led to unprecedented
personal independence in regards to news. Public diplomacy though exists as a prime
tool in the counterterrorism toolbox. A loose mélange of new and traditional media
platforms permits it to guarantee a comprehensive reach of efforts as it informs the public
while also countering the terrorism agenda with equally clear and appealing rhetoric.
But how effectively has the Western world used this tactic? Former U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates aptly encompassed in 2007 the US’s success in public
diplomacy in today’s web-based world:
Public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at
communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture,
about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain
embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than
America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, “How has one man in a
cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication society?” Speed,
agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing
U.S. strategic communications. 147

Today’s terrorists make extraordinary use of the new media, further accentuating the idea
that terrorism evolves ahead of counterterrorism. Groups like AQ and IS have turned to
social media for propaganda, psychological warfare, and weapons tutorials since it allows
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anyone to publish or access information. 148 Often, it is comparatively inexpensive yet
significantly more wide-reaching; in 2013, the average American user spent 23 hours
emailing, texting, and using social media or other forms of communication. This new
version of media allows terrorist organizations to approach their intended audience
directly instead of waiting for their audience to come to them (as was the case in older
forms of media with strictly websites). Consider the following call to action on a jihadi
online forum calling for a “Facebook Invasion”:
Facebook is a great idea, and better than the forums. Instead of waiting for people to
[come to you so you can] inform them, you go to them and teach them!…[I] mean, if you
have a group of 5,000 people, with the press of a button you [can] send them a
standardized message. I entreat you, by God, to begin registering for Facebook as soon
as you [finish] reading this post. Familiarize yourselves with it. This post is a seed and a
beginning, to be followed by serious efforts to optimize our Facebook usage. Let’s start
distributing Islamic jihadi publications, posts, articles, and pictures. Let’s anticipate a
reward from the Lord of the Heavens, dedicate our purpose to God, and help our
colleagues.149

The Western world has witnessed a modernization of terrorism that targets the people
with whom public diplomacy is supposed to communicate.
For public diplomacy to work, Western democracies must communicate on all
media platforms, both new and old, more effectively and more widely than terrorist
organizations. They must provide “counterprogramming to offset the message of
proponents of hatred and violence.”150 The Western world must be a fierce competitor to
terrorist organizations to deter any support they may be attempting to garner. It must
affirm values that challenge the legitimacy of terrorism as an effective means to a
political, ideological, or religious goal. In a report by the British Research, Information,
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and Communication Unit of the Home Office, the UK called for a governmental targeting
of the AQ narrative which “combines fact, fiction, emotion, and religion and manipulates
discontent about local and international issues.” 151 This narrative is accommodating and
flexible, allowing terrorist organizations to exploit an array of situations and grievances
that turn people towards radicalization. Well-designed public diplomacy can reach large
numbers of the political public and can challenge terrorism at its base. Public diplomacy
can dispute the narratives of terrorist organizations and proactively deter terrorism and
radicalization. According to Joseph Nye, “Democratic leaders must use soft or attractive
power to disseminate a positive narrative about globalization and the prospects for a
better future that attracts moderates and counters the poisonous jihadist narratives on the
Web.”152
Ultimately, the public will either deepen their trust in governmental abilities to
protect them or will become disillusioned, calling upon the social contract as a
benchmark by which the government should begin to abide again. The public will
witness a shift from hard power toward more political approaches, designed to offset
terrorist messages. While this takes a more governmentally oriented direction, it will
allow endorsement of the Islam of peace by moderate Muslims as opposed to the Islam of
extremism and will diminish the fearmongering capacity of the media. Thus, the media
will be a force in guarding democratic values of transparency, freedom, and openness and
guarding against governmental abuse of power in attempting to protect the nation and
secure freedom from fear. 153 Two truths exist in media that must be upheld in order to
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protect journalistic rights and the self-evident rights of the public. To guard these
democratic values and human rights, the media and journalists must “stay vigilant,
protecting their rights and obligations to keep the public informed and leaders
accountable”.154 Second, journalists cannot forget that rights are a necessary component
of a free democratic society and that they have a responsibility to keep that society safe
and secure by what it reports, further iterating the need to find the middle ground between
unfettered freedom of expression in the press and freedom from fear.
Due to the prevalent and extant nature of terrorism in the Western world, national
insecurity remains a critical concern for the Western world as they attempt to stabilize,
through effective, efficient, and ethical methods, a citizenry wrought with fear. Media
exploitation and sensationalization of violence and terrorism as a form of public
entertainment only exacerbate this problem and the civil liberties issues. Ultimately, the
human rights infringement of several nations and the media’s fearmongering question the
efficacy of these supposed tactics, highlighting the necessity for novel, positive, and
successful strategies. As Richard A. Posner posits, “only with the benefit of hindsight
can a reaction be separated into proper and excess layers.” 155 Posner eloquently depicts
the unfortunate nature of actions controlled by the fear of terrorism that plague
counterterrorism response and strategy where methods are excessive and rudimentary at
best. The media must overcome its blind, corrupt watchdog mentality so as to imbue an
environment where counterterrorism strategy can effectively work while promulgating
information for human rights and human rights advocacy, regardless of governmental
action, inaction, and sway.
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Future Interplay
Globalization undeniably dominates the world today, and the key to effective
counterterrorism strategy is a proper utilization of resources. Thus, counterterrorism
should reflect the global order in which it finds itself. Nation-states must look to the
recent past to understand what the best responses are to the current terrorist situation and
to understand how best to maintain the nonnegotiable aspects of human rights. They
cannot limit themselves to their isolated experiences; the interrelatedness of liberal
democracies can afford crucial insight into truisms and successes. In addition to this
multilateral cooperation, cosmopolitan self-determination allows the public citizenry to
have a more nuanced influence as “leaders construct national interest in accordance with
the needs of their own citizenry, guided by accountability to internalized universal
principles—rather than by hegemonic aspirations.” 156
Human rights remain a vital component of a sustainable defense of the citizenry
and democratic political community. In addition, the construction of national security
under the lens of human rights will not be an individualistic endeavor for nation states. 157
Multilateral cooperation encompasses the future of liberal democracies’ battle against
terrorism. Nation states will need to work together to understand the complexities of
counterterrorism that cherish and nurture human rights protection. Knowledge through
this meaningful multilateralism will promote sustainable human security that overcomes
the excessive feeling of vulnerability in international terror and provides nation states
with an intricate framework for resolving underlying conflict. 158 National insecurity
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cannot act as a hindrance to liberal democratic states in their pursuit of effective
counterterrorism strategies.
In liberal democracies, the fundamental precepts revolve around the commitment
to freedom and openness. 159 Thus, any counterterrorism strategy implemented must
parallel the foundational principles of the governmental structure. By embracing a
democratic national security process, the state maintains democratic rule of law,
transparency, and participation and protects citizens from misguided or ill-informed
policies.160 Liberal democracies cannot fall prey to the terroristic psychological goals of
public intimidation and overreaction by the government. After the 9/11 attacks and after
the US began to limit certain civil liberties, Osama bin Laden said, “So I say that freedom
and human rights in America have been sent to the guillotine with no prospect of return,
unless these values are quickly reinstated. The government will take the American
people and the West in general to a choking life, into an unsupportable hell.” 161 The US
did not withstand the pressure from the security threats that it felt and regrettably fulfilled
the objectives of bin Laden and AQ. Governing bodies must focus on safety measures
that are minimally intrusive and highly productive in terms of public protection and
cannot lose civil liberties as a result of public authorities failing to respond to the needs of
the public.162
As noted by Osama bin Laden above, common culture and threat bind Western
liberal democracies together, especially in their pursuit of counterterrorism. The
interplay of individual nation-states should amplify the interplay of the three entities
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examined in this paper. Countries can learn from the mistakes and successes of other
countries in their respective counterterrorism operations. Two such examples of this are
Norway’s responses to the 2011 lone-wolf attacks by Anders Breivik and France’s
responses to the 2015 Paris Bombings. On July 22, 2011, Breivik killed 77 people at a
youth camp run by the Labour Party in Norway. 163 Post-9/11 but pre-22 July, Norway
was rather passive on its counterterrorism measures and policies. It often assumed the
policies enacted at a supranational level that were more of a reflection of American
ideology than Norwegian ideology. However, after the attacks, Norway undertook more
definitive and active measures in combatting terrorism that were distinct from traditional
views on counterterrorism. The Norwegian government transitioned to counterterrorism
measures that focused on compliance, solidarity, moral obligation, and precaution.
Following the attacks, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg enunciated that Norway sought to
meet terrorism with more openness and democracy but not with naïveté. 164 Because of
this sentiment, it was doubtful that Norway would pursue a new direction of
counterterrorism policies that had the possibility of infringing on civil liberties, an ideal
held at the core of the socialist government. Norway was more likely, however, to
implement further the international measures that were already in place in Norwegian
government and society.
Norway took into consideration the actions of the US government after 9/11. It
maintained a balance of increased national security policy but preserved the civil liberties
that its citizenry had. It studied how the US responded and acted in reflection of that.
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One of the most intriguing points of the Norwegian response was the public response to
the attacks. While the Norwegians did show extreme levels of patriotism and solidarity
and a regard for national ideals like Americans did after 9/11, the push for a vengeful
response was lacking and appeared to be largely absent. This last point comes in direct
opposition to the response of the majority of the American public. This can potentially
be attributed to ideological differences in the motives of the culprits. Islamist extremists
of AQ perpetrated 9/11 while a far-right extremist perpetrated 22 July. However, cultural
differences may be a better explanation for the disparate reactions. H.D.S Greenway, a
journalist at The Boston Globe, explains this stance by emphasizing the innate nature for
conflict resolution over military intervention of the Norwegians as the primary factor for
the disparity.165 Future research that compares and explains the tendency of Norway to
follow approaches rooted in openness and democracy would be beneficial for future
responses in Western democracies.
More apt though is the response of France and more broadly the EU to the Paris
and Brussels attacks. Their responses had extreme semblance to the responses of the US
after 9/11. Following 9/11, the US increased government surveillance, targeted certain
communities, redoubled military efforts internationally, and adopted the USA Patriot Act.
Following the November Paris Attacks, France and the EU saw the targeting of an entire
community, specifically the Molenbeek community in Brussels which has been
considered a jihadist safe haven in Europe due to the support shown by some residents. 166
France and the EU have also redoubled their military efforts in Syria following the
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attacks. Additionally, France introduced a bill reminiscent of the USA Patriot Act into
the French Parliament. An important fact to note though is that even though France
adopted such similar measures in 2015, many socialist French authorities were skeptical
after 9/11 of the US approach. It was a perfunctory action that did not consider the
mistakes of the US counterterrorism approach. France had 14 years to observe the
success of the US and should have built off of that in their application of counterterrorism
measures. Western liberal democracies have to learn from each other; common, reflexlike reactions cannot dictate nor mire down the counterterrorism response policy.
Mohamedou lays out this explanation in the following quotation:
…When Western democracies are attacked, they tend to react in this way which is to think of [the
attack] as an existential threat as opposed to looking at it as a political or policy threat. And in
painting it that way, I think that the French administration was able to echo some of that language
by saying this is about our way of life, this is about us and someone. And many people don’t
agree with that. This was not necessarily that reasoning that should have been adopted early on.
This is mostly about discreet policies that could be identified. Because if you paint it that way,
you are in fact mirroring, sort of, the civilizational talk of your enemy, painting with such big
brushes. 167

This mimicry fascinatingly reveals the dominant approach to securitization in the
Western world. Western states must consider the recent history and experiences of other
countries. Our world is not limited to individual states but is a cosmopolitan array of
states that support each other in numerous ways. In terms of terrorism and
counterterrorism, states can diagnosis the relative successes and mistakes that other states
make and can then apply measures and policies that circumvent the mistakes and
capitalize the successes. Documents like the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
underscore the collective and cooperative nature of counterterrorism strategies. 168
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Liberal democracies cannot function completely autonomously; they must depend on the
interrelation that they share with each other. The collective values, norms, and histories
concerning terrorism highlight democracy’s status as a strong structure for a long-term
response to terror through “reliable information, sophisticated understanding of structural
causes and the global context, effective options for the control of violence, and
international support.”169
More importantly than just the interrelatedness of Western liberal democracies,
states also should acknowledge the utility of the interaction of the range of
counterterrorism strategies that they possess. Intelligence, education, and media framing
all emphasize vital parts of democratic paradigms and systems. Intelligence highlights
the actions of governments within counterterrorism strategy. Intelligence remains the
most important part of deterring terrorism and will continue to be the foremost strategy.
Governments, especially those of liberal democracies, have a national security precept
that they are expected to uphold due to the social contract that dictates democratic
governance. If people contend that security is a universal individual right, the foundation
of national security and counterterrorism would be the protection of the individual from
external threats and state violence. 170 Intelligence institutions and their operations allow
states to proactively deter, thwart, and combat attacks that terrorist organizations are
plotting, thus actively working to ensure security for individuals. Intelligence operations
will remain the key component to fighting terrorist attacks, heralding back to traditional
counterterrorism strategy.171
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However, terrorism has expanded and evolved. No longer is terrorism simply the
planned and premeditated actions of a specific terrorist organization and of dispatched
foreign nationals. Radicalization and lone-wolf terrorism have diverged from traditional
terrorism; they characterize the new tactics of terrorist organizations. This is the realm
where educational institutions and proper media framing of terrorism and
counterterrorism seem to be advantageous to counterterrorism strategies. As for
education strategies, they must be proactive. Prevent focuses significantly on the
aftermath of radicalization and then addressing this problem; it is more of a deradicalization mechanism. 172 While it has stipulated the need for preventing people from
being drawn into terrorism, the UK government has allocated more guidelines, funding,
and training to detecting radicalization and stopping or reversing it than for prevention.
Future educational strategies must recognize and capitalize on anti-radicalization
measures more so than deradicalization measures. Educational strategies like Prevent
bring the public into the realm of counterterrorism. Inclusive rhetoric by public figures
such as police officers, school teachers, and professors challenges marginalization effects
that people may feel, effects that have the potential of turning people towards
radicalization. Radicalization targets the disillusioned which is most effectively hindered
by day-to-day interactions. Intelligence is not able to effectively prevent, detect, and
deter radicalization; lone-actor terrorism does not have a network for intelligence to
track, and radicalization is such an individualized and psychological phenomenon that it
would require copious amounts of human intelligence to adequately cover. 173 The public
thus has an active role in the anti-radicalization element of counterterrorism.
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Furthermore, proper and ethical media framing also plays a vital role in
counterterrorism endeavors. The media is one of the principal entities in democratic
societies, promulgating information to the public. While some argue that news agencies
have resorted to sensationalized approaches that only seek ratings, the media is also the
chief window of information for the public. Sensationalized news propagates inaccurate
representations of communities, and when sensationalizing Islamist terrorism, Muslim
and Arab communities fall into the suspectification effect and the repercussions of
Islamophobia.174 The alienation and disenfranchisement that Muslims feel can lead to
different responses, yet politicization and radicalization is a real consequence of unethical
reporting that knowingly or unknowingly stigmatizes a community as a whole. Thus, the
media should frame terrorism and counterterrorism operations in a light that protects the
sanctity of the information exchange of the media while also promoting clear delineations
between moderates and extremes.
These three institutions represent fundamental components of democracies.
Intelligence symbolizes the government; education the public; and then the media is a
key component in and of itself. Thus, counterterrorism strategy that utilizes these three
institutions will address and employ a wide range of strategies that is not limited to one or
the other. It is a well-versed, multifaceted approach that considers the quotidian
interactions of individuals while also properly using the resources it has. However, this
approach is not an exhaustive combination of democratic institutions. Further strategies
should seek to include other institutions, particularly private ones like multinational
corporations, non-governmental organizations, and even religious organizations.
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Terrorism cannot only be framed as a governmental and security agency focus. By
framing terrorism in this way, it limits the responses to these institutions only,
legitimizing the idea that terrorism can and should only be addressed by professionals in
these arenas. However, terrorism is more largely a societal issue that melds state and
society. Terrorism targets the citizenry, and thus counterterrorism should include the
citizenry. The citizenry and public plays a massive role in the inclusive rhetoric that
counterprograms radicalization.
Ultimately, counterterrorism cannot be singular. It must include as many
possibilities and institutions as possible that attempt to mitigate the effects of terrorism.
Multilateral, pluralist policies and strategies will combat terrorism with a portfolio of
responses that seek to address all aspects of the terrorist regime from financing to
operations to recruitment. Particularly, counterterrorism must deepen international
coordination and communication to outmatch the transnational characteristics that
terrorism currently has. Western counterterrorism strategies must push to become one
step ahead of modern terrorism. Proactivity will be the most effective paradigm in
counterterrorism strategy since it seeks to address terrorism and protect from it before it
has the chance to arise.
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